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REFLECTIONS ON SCIENTER (AND THE SECURITIES FRAUD 
CASE AGAINST MARTHA STEWART THAT NEVER HAPPENED) 
by 
Donald C. Langevoorl 
This paper considers what research in cognitive psychology and 
behavioral economics has to say about one of the basic "state of mind" 
constructs in the law of fraud: scienter. It takes a clinical approach, 
examining the securities fraud case that never happened against Martha 
Stewart. In granting a judgment of acquittal in Stewart's favor on the 
securities fraud charge, the court seemingly misunderstood the law of 
scienter, which turns on awareness rather than purpose. But that simply 
provides an opportunity to think about what awareness means in the 
context of financial transactions. From publicly available sources, 
interesting inferences can be drawn about what Martha Stewart was 
thinking (andfeeling) during the events at issue. 
I. MARTHA STEW ART'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL SECURITIES 
FRAUD VIOLATION ................................................................................... 3 
A. The Story ................................................................................................ 3 
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D. A Cognitive Perspective on Defining Scienter ....................................... 8 
II. MARTHA STEWART'S INSIDER TRADING ......................................... 11 
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IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 16 
Behavioral law and economics normally works at a high level of 
generality, predicting how people commonly make judgments and decisions in 
certain broad classes of situations, and deriving policy prescriptions from those 
predictions. This can be a useful exercise when done properly, though it 
inevitably draws the criticism that real-life situations vary enough (not to 
mention actors themselves) that such generalizations are dangerous in applied 
• 1 
settmgs. 
A less common approach is to be clinical: focusing attention on an 
observed judgment or decision and using the tools of psychology to try to 
• Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks 
to Meir Statman for comments on an earlier draft, and to faculty and students at Georgetown, 
Stetson, Temple, and the Lewis & Clark forum for helpful feedback. 
I E.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not be 
Traded/or Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2004). 
1 
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explain what otherwise might seem to be puzzling behavior. Though risky 
because single observations will not always confonn to even the most well-
established behavioral predictions, this exercise has the virtue of presenting a 
richly defined situation as a reality check. From a legal perspective, this 
exercise can be used to evaluate that behavior-by understanding it better, we 
might become better able to assess its blameworthiness, for example. 
This paper will do some of both. My interest is in scienter under the law of 
fraud, particularly as applied under Rule IOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. Although it is clear that IOb-5 has a scienter requirement,2 its exact 
contours-indeed, what at heart the requirement really means-may still not be 
entirely certain.3 One aim of this paper is to consider various fonnulations of 
scienter offered by the courts and test how well they are likely to fit the 
cognitions of actors in the financial marketplace in 'light of what we know or 
suspect from recent psychological research. 
To be concrete about this, I will examine the IOb-5 case against Martha 
Stewart. As most readers know, Stewart-the home products celebrity and 
then-CEO of her own publicly traded company, Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia (MSLO)-was tried and convicted in 2004 on federal charges 
involving the making of false statements to the government, arising out of an 
SEC and FBI investigation into her alleged insider trading in the shares of 
ImClone, a biotechnology company.4 Prosecutors chose not to charge her for 
the insider trading itself (though the SEC did bring a parallel civil insider 
trading case against her, which is still pending).5 The prosecutors did charge 
her with a IOb-5 violation for lying publicly about the investigation in a way 
that allegedly influenced the price of MSLO stock. Late in the trial, however, 
the court granted a judgment of acquittal on the securities fraud charge,6 so that 
the case went to the jury only on the obstruction and false statement claims. 
I think that the court was wrong on this as a matter of law, which I will 
explain. But my main point is that the underlying interpretive issue exposes 
how porous the definition of scienter is from a psychology perspective when 
applied in a difficult case. This is not to say that Stewart was innocent of a 10b-
5 violation-I think there is evidence to suggest that she did act with scienter as 
2 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). Hochfelder was clear in its 
rejection of negligence as an appropriate state of mind standard: otherwise, it spoke only in 
dicta of scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud" and 
as action other than in good faith. Id. at 193 n.12. See generally James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977). 
3 See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 648-51 
(4th ed. 2004). 
4 She was charged with other related crimes, including obstruction of justice and 
conspiracy. 
5 SEC v. Stewart, SEC Litig. Release No. 18169,2003 WL 21278259 (S.D.N.Y. June 
4, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Litig. Release]. The SEC's formal complaint, which contains a 
more detailed statement of the case against Stewart, is attached to the release. 
6 United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see Jury Convicts 
Martha Stewart on Conspiracy, Obstruction Charges, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 425 
(March 8, 2004). 
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commonly understood. I simply want to use the issues surrounding her case to 
emphasize the troubling distance between how the legal system applies state of 
mind rules and how social scientists think about concepts such as awareness 
and motivation. 
Of course a legal realist would point out that scienter as applied is not 
what was actually going on in the mind of the defendant at the time, but rather 
what the judge or jury thinks was going on. The cognitive biases we should be 
considering, then, are not those of the actor but of the evaluator asked to 
determine the defendant's state of mind. I agree, and concede the likelihood 
that such familiar cognitive regularities as the hindsight bias and the 
fundamental attribution bias will often lead to fact-finding that does not 
accurately describe the defendant's true state of mind.7 My main point-that 
many actors in the corporate setting or the financial markets mislead others 
without scienter as that requirement is defined as a matter of law-may well in 
reality be offset by the fact that judges or juries may find them guilty or liable 
anyway. 
But that makes the normative question all the more troubling. Precisely 
what kind of mental state is deserving of the penalties associated with securities 
fraud? How strict should the scienter requirement be? Especially after the 
recent financial scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a finding of 
securities fraud can bring rather draconian penalties, in terms of fines, civil 
judgments, and serious jail time. Understanding the psychological aspects of 
securities fraud is important at least to help us fit the remedy to the wrong. 
I. MARTHA STEWART'S ALLEGED CRIMINAL SECURITIES FRAUD 
VIOLATION 
A. TheStory 
As charged by government authorities, Martha Stewart's legal troubles 
began on December 27,2001.8 The day before, insiders at ImClone learned that 
7 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 
65 U. CHi. L. REv. 571 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A 
Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 V AND. L. REv. 75, 
108-09 (1993); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. 
L. REv. 101, 158 n.199 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions]. The 
psychology of jury decision-making is obviously a major research area. See e.g., Reid Hastie 
et ai., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for 
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999). 
8 This account is taken from the criminal indictment, which I am assuming (in light of 
the conviction by the jury) to be true, and the SEC's civil complaint. See Superseding 
Indictment, U.S. v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (03 Cr. 717 (MGC)) 
[hereinafter Stewart Superseding Indictment]; SEC Litig. Release, supra note 5. Obviously, 
the true facts may be different. For other commentaries on the securities' fraud claim, see 
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of Rule JOb-5 for 
Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts (unpublished manuscript); Dale A. Osterle, 
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the FDA would take adverse action with respect to its key anti-cancer drug 
under development, Erbitux. (The securities markets were anxiously awaiting a 
decision from the FDA; it was public knowledge that the FDA had until the last 
day of December to decide one way or the other.) For reasons that themselves 
are hard to fathom given the unambiguous legal risk associated with such 
behavior, this news led ImClone's CEO, Sam Waksal, to try to sell his stock, 
and he succeeded in causing his daughter and father to sell out their holdings. 
Waksal's efforts to sell were channeled through his stockbroker at Merrill 
Lynch, Peter Bacanovic, who was also Stewart's broker.9 Through his assistant, 
Bacanovic communicated to Stewart on the 27th that the price of ImClone was 
likely to be trading downward and that the Waksals were selling, which caused 
Stewart to direct that all of her ImClone stock be sold immediately. The price 
thereafter continued to fall, so that by selling when she did rather than at the 
bottom of the market, Stewart avoided a loss of approximately $45,000, an 
extraordinarily small amount compared to her total net worth. to 
A federal investigation was commenced almost immediately, with Stewart 
readily identified as a seller with ties to Bacanovic, Waksal, and ImClone. 11 
Stewart voluntarily appeared in early February and told investigators that she 
and Bacanovic had recently reviewed her portfolio and come to an 
understanding, among other things, that her ImClone stock should be sold 
should the price fall to $60 per share from the $70 or so that it was trading at in 
the late fall. Because the price fell below $60 on December 27, the sell order 
was triggered. She denied receiving any information about ImClone or the 
Waksals in the call that afternoon. 
The government's ImClone investigation continued throughout the spring, 
and led to a Congressional inquiry as well. Eventually, the press learned of 
Stewart's situation and she was asked to comment. Through her attorney, she 
told reporters the same story that she had told investigators, i.e., that she was 
not guilty of any insider trading because she had received no inside information 
and that the sales were the result of the pre-arranged plan to sell at $60, and 
these responses appeared in print on June 7. Essentially, this was repeated in a 
more elaborate press release on June 12 and a meeting with securities analysts 
covering MSLO on June 19. 
Largely based on cooperative testimony from the broker's assistant in 
return for leniency, the investigators came to believe that Stewart's testimony 
and public statements were false-that there was no pre-existing sell order, and 
that such a story had been fabricated (and an effort made to falsify documents) 
Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow 
Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash with Donaldson Over Turf, the Choice of Civil or Criminal 
Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443 (2004). 
9 Importantly, Stewart and Waksal were also close friends; Waksal had once dated 
Stewart's daughter, and he and Stewart socialized frequently. For an interesting background 
on the Stewart case, including the trial, see Jeffrey Toobin, A Bad Thing: Why Did Martha 
Stewart Lose?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2004, at 61. 
10 The irony is that the FDA eventually gave its approval to Erbitux, and by the time 
Stewart was being sentenced to prison, ImClone shares were trading at around $85 per share. 
II Merrill Lynch compliance officials set the investigation in motion. 
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as part of a cover-up devised by Stewart and Bacanovic once they learned of 
the investigation. In the prosecutors' view this supported both the obstruction 
and securities fraud charges, because the lies were directed to both the 
government and the investing public (purchasers and sellers of MSLO shares). 
As noted, the criminal indictment was silent with respect to the alleged insider 
trading. 
B. The Dismissal of the Securities Fraud Claim 
Stewart moved for of a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the court granted with respect to 
the one securities fraud count late in the trial. 12 As the court framed the issue, 
the question was whether a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt-
without mere speculation-that Stewart acted with scienter in making false 
statements to the investing public. The court did not address the question of 
whether the "willfulness" standard application to criminal prosecutions under 
Rule 10b-5 required a different state of mind showing than in a civil case. The 
prosecution offered evidence that Stewart was the controlling shareholder of 
MSLO and regularly concerned with the company's stock price (as a result of 
publicity about the government's investigation, the price of MSLO stock 
dropped by more than 30 percent). The inference was that Stewart had lied to 
counteract the downward pressure on the stock. 
The court ruled that a reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Stewart intended to deceive investors, even assuming the falsity of 
her public statements. As the court saw it, the question was whether her 
''purpose was to influence the market in MSLO securities.,,\3 Essentially, the 
court thought that there were too many other possible purposes for a jury to 
reach that level of certainty: 
Here, the evidence and inferences ... are simply too weak to support a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal intent. To compound that 
weak evidence with the reasonable inferences that Stewart possessed 
many other intents-to protest her innocence or repair her reputation, to 
reassure her business partners, advertisers, and the consumers of her 
products-would only invite the jury to speculate. 14 
C. The Law of Scienter 
The court seems to have misunderstood the law. There has been a long-
standing issue about whether purpose or motivation should be relevant to the 
scienter determination, and one can find occasional dicta that suggests that that 
12 Thereby making it non-appealable. The court had earlier refused to dismiss the 
securities charge, which had been argued by Stewart's lawyers largely on grounds that the 
June statements were immaterial as a matter of law. 
13 United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (emphasis 
added). 
14 ld. at 378. 
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purpose is relevant. ls But the weight of authority is that the relevant question is 
not motive or purpose but awareness--did the defendant know or recklessly 
disregard that what she was saying was false?16 The clearest statement of this, 
ironically, came in the only securities case cited by the court in its opinion 
(albeit on a different point of law), AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. Ernst & 
Young.17 There, the Second Circuit admonished the trial court because it 
"inappropriately [made] the scienter issue one of 'what did the defendant want 
to happen' as opposed to 'what could the defendant reasonably foresee as a 
potential result of his action.,,,18 That, of course, is exactly what the court did in 
Stewart, too. If one uses forseeability as the test, there were ample grounds for 
inferring that Stewart understood the likely impact of her lie on the MSLO 
market. Indeed, that was precisely how the prosecution had presented its 
evidence. 
In fact, forseeability may not be the precise articulation either if what we 
are talking about is scienter. An appreciation of the falsity by the speaker is all 
that is necessary. The forseeability standard goes to something slightly 
different, subject-matter jurisdiction as embodied in the requirement that the 
fraud be "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security." Not all fraud is 
securities fraud, and the prevailing "in connection with" standard is whether the 
defendant's misrepresentation or omission was "reasonably calculated to 
influence the investing public.,,19 Though the word "calculated" might connote 
purpose or motivation, courts have instead said---consistent with the scienter 
standard-that the test is whether the defendant appreciated the likely effect on 
investors, with forseeability being the best way to answer that question?O In 
this way, AUSA was conjoining the scienter and "in connection with" tests in a 
way that makes holistic sense in defining what constitutes securities fraud. 
The awareness or appreciation standard-as opposed to motive or 
purpose-finds support in the way that the case law has evolved on a number 
of points. In dicta, the Supreme Court essentially endorsed it in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson when it rejected the idea that showing a "good business purpose" for 
15 See State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981). Fluor 
is an ambiguous precedent because the court was facing the problem of a company's 
affirmative duty to disclose, which it saw as presenting a separate problem. 
16 See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 629 F.2d 62, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 5C ARNOLD S. 
JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:75 (2001); 3B 
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 
13.20 (2d ed. 2005) ("intent to deceive was actionable at common law irrespective of motive 
or purpose": rule is the same under Rule IOb-5). One important consequence-quite relevant 
to the question in Stewart-is that one can be liable under IOb-5 even if the deception of 
investors was simply a consequence of a plan to deceive someone else (e.g., a defense 
contractor lying to the Defense Department). See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
17 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). 
18 Id. at 221. 
19 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
20 See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Carter Wallace 
Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Ames Dep't Store Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
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a misrepresentation would insulate a defendant from liability?l It is also 
implicit in the now nearly universal recognition that recklessness suffices as the 
basis for scienter22-reckless disregard of the truth goes to the defendants' 
awareness or appreciation, not purpose. 
Understanding why the court took such a wrong tum in rejecting the 
prosecution's securities fraud case against Stewart is hard; there is no legal 
analysis or citation of cases on this point. One possibility, which should be 
guarded against, is that the court was confused by the substantial body of law 
on pleading scienter under the heightened pleading standard of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act.23 There is a vast amount of case law about 
whether showing a strong enough motive will satisfy that burden, and the 
Second Circuit is one of the more receptive to motive-based analysis.24 Because 
pleading cases are by far the most frequent context in which the issue is raised, 
it might be easy for a trial judge to think that the scienter requirement itself is 
about motive. However, the questions are entirely different. The pleading 
requirement is about whether plaintiffs get to go to discovery, where solid 
evidence about awareness or appreciation can be elicited through document 
production and depositions. Allegations of motive are made important because 
they help distinguish between strong and weak cases at that early stage, before 
the pressure to settle becomes overwhelming. But at the trial stage-after 
discovery has been allowed-the standard becomes the conventional one 
(although motive and opportunity may still be relevant evidence in arguing a 
circumstantial case of knowledge or recklessness). 
Is it possible that the error was harmless? That would be so if there were 
some separate ground for making Stewart's purpose the controlling question. In 
a criminal case, violations of Rule IOb-5 must not only be with scienter but also 
"willful"-a stricter state of mind that arguably supports a motivation (specific 
intent) test. But here again, there is no compelling support in the case law. The 
Second Circuit has indicated that willfulness requires a realization on the part 
of the defendant that he was acting "wrongfully," which may (or may not) be 
something more than simply awareness of the falsity.25 If we assume that 
Stewart knew that what she was saying was untrue, it is hard to find a lack of 
willfulness simply because her lie might have been directed more to the 
consuming public or company stakeholders than to investors?6 
21 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988). 
22 See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (lst Cir. 1999); JAMES D. Cox 
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 650 (4th ed. 2004). 
23 This seems to have been the case in A USA, Life Ins. Co. See 206 F.3d at 221 n.12. 
24 See, e.g., Novak v. Kosaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000). 
25 See United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d l388 (2d Cir. 1976). Arguably, however, this is 
too strict: some believe that willfulness only requires that the defendant simply know the 
facts that underlie the offense. See William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAW. 
961 (2003); Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Mens Rea Required/or a Criminal Violation a/the 
Federal Securities Laws?, 52 Bus. LAW. 35 (1996). 
26 Had Stewart simply (but assume falsely) proclaimed her innocence without giving 
any specific factual details, there is a good chance that this would be treated as the 
equivalent of puffery (i.e., immaterial as a matter of law}-a general statement of the sort 
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The judgment of acquittal seems to have been a legal error, then, 
substantially in Stewart's favor. If so, it was also a material error, because had 
the jury convicted her of securities fraud as well as making false statements, the 
likely criminal sentence would have been far greater than the five months she 
served. ESfecially after Sarbanes-Oxley, the likely sentence would have been 
crippling.2 
D. A Cognitive Perspective on Defining Scienter 
One contribution that the cognition research can offer is to help understand 
the nature and consequences of one approach or another to a legal standard like 
scienter. To me, the research strengthens the preference for an "awareness" 
standard rather than one based on motivation or purpose. Motivation is 
extraordinarily complex, and often unconscious. The conscious perception of 
one's own motive is often inaccurate-a rationalization designed to buffer 
anxiety or guilt, or maintain self-esteem. If securities fraud wants to reach 
harmful behavior, it should not let cognitive excuses (for example, a lie by 
Martha Stewart that she thought was necessary to protect company employees 
or customers who were so heavily invested in her brand) be relevant. 
That said, we should realize that the preferable "awareness" standard is 
also on somewhat shaky cognitive ground. Although much of the judgment and 
decision-making literature deals with choice (especially risky choice) rather 
than perception, the two are inseparable--choices are largely defined by how 
the prevailing situation is perceived. And the psychology literature is filled with 
studies of how peoples' mental models of reality can diverge from reality 
objectively defined. There is a wonderfully metaphorical illustration of this 
created by University of Illinois researcher Daniel Simons, familiar to many 
who have been introduced to the behavioral research.28 An audience is asked to 
watch a short video of a group of people moving about passing a basketball, 
some in black shirts, others in white. The audience is asked to pay close 
attention and count the number of times those dressed in one color catch the 
ball. This is not easy because of the rapid movements of the crowd in a 
confined space. When the viewing is over, the presenter asks the audience for 
the right number. Most come fairly close; many get it correct. 
Then the presenter asks how many people noticed the man in the gorilla 
expected from a defendant regardless of guilt, and thus not taken seriously by the reasonable 
investor. Indeed, in its motion to dismiss, the Stewart defense argued that even the broader 
set of denials and explanations by Stewart should be deemed immaterial. Arguably, she 
could argue that she foresaw no market impact because she assumed that sophisticated 
investors would treat her denials as puffery (which would merge the materiality into a 
scienter analysis), but it is difficult to see how this could be accepted as a matter of law, 
without factual inquiry into her thinking. 
27 Waksal was sentenced to seven years in prison, though the counts against him 
included tax evasion as well. See Leslie Eaton, The Ghost of Waksal Past Hovers Over the 
Stewart Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,2004, at Cl. 
28 Videotape: Sustained Inattentional Blindness-Selective Looking (Daniel J. 
Simons, 2004), available at http://viscog.beckman.uiuc.eduJdjs_lab/demos.html. 
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suit walking among the crowd in the video. Most did not. 29 Yet when the video 
is repeated the presence of the gorilla is clear and striking to everyone. The 
point is that perceptions are a product of prior expectations, especially when 
one is concentrating on something else. This is related to a phenomenon 
psychologists call cognitive conservatism, the tendency not to perceive a 
change in one's surroundin~s or situation because expectations are built around 
the situation as it had been. 0 
At the risk of oversimplification, my sense is that many (though certainly 
not all) actors caught up in financial scandals failed to notice the gorilla. Take a 
lawyer working for Enron, working excessively long hours in structured 
finance to put together a series of special purpose entities. The prevailing 
"schema" and task definition are narrow and focused; it becomes entirely 
possible that disconfirming information remains outside of attention until the 
problem is exposed in a vivid, salient fashion. If we ask whether the actor was 
actually aware of the fraud, the answer will often be "no." This is so even if we 
shift to the recklessness component of scienter, which most all courts now 
define as "highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not 
merely simple or even inexcusable negligence but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, [presenting] a danger of misleading buyers or 
sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the 
defendant must have been aware of it.,,3l This is a "subjective" standard of 
recklessness, essentially asking whether the defendant was aware that he or she 
didn't know whether what was being said was true (even though it might be). 
Once we start asking whether the risk was known or so obvious that the 
defendant must have been aware of it, we run into the same problem of biased 
perception. 
Of course, as noted earlier, a defendant will only be found to lack 
awareness if the judge or jury so determines, and there are ample reasons to 
doubt whether they will be inclined to accept a claim of a schema-based 
defense. This is much the same as the hindsight bias problem: the jury will be 
told and shown that (metaphorically) the gorilla was in the room, and it may 
well then seem "so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." 
If judges and juries make such inferences, there will be more findings of 
scienter than the law-strictly construed-would warrant. Whether this is good 
or bad as a matter of policy is open to question. One could certainly argue that, 
in light of the cognition literature, we ought to move away from knowledge or 
subjective awareness in favor of something like negligence or gross negligence 
if we want the law to have its desired deterrence or compensatory effect. And 
judges and juries may be applying the law as if that were the standard. But if 
29 I certainly did not when I first viewed the video. 
30 See Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Managerial Responses to Changing Environments: 
Perspectives on Problem Sensing/rom Social Cognition, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 548 (1982). For 
an example with significant legal implications, see Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and 
Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis 0/ Missed Opportunities, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 379 (1992). 
31 Broad v. Rockwell Int'I Corp., 642 F.2d 929,961-62 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 965 (1981). 
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so, we ought at least appreciate the acoustic separation between the law as 
articulated and the law as applied. In turn, if we come to see that some lower 
state of mind standard is.actually being applied-i.e., that many actors found to 
have violated Rule IOb-5 did not have a contemporaneous appreciation that 
they were complicit in a fraud-we might want to rethink how we punish them. 
They may still be worthy of liability simply because we want to encourage 
greater watchfulness or see the victims compensated, but we should not 
necessarily tar them with labels of corruption or venality unless we simply want 
to act out a morality play in more vivid shades of black and white.32 
Now let us return to Martha Stewart. If we assume that there was inside 
information passed on by Bacanovic' s assistant and no pre-existing instruction 
to sell, it is not easy to make a case of cognitive blindness when she said 
otherwise to investigators and the public. (To be clear, I think the above 
discussion applies more easily to financial frauds that were characterized by a 
high degree of informational and normative ambiguity, as I have explored 
elsewhere.).33 If asked to speculate, I would guess that Stewart suffered from an 
illusion of control typical of highly successful executives: the belief that 
bluffing and dissembling was something she had done well many times before 
and could get away with again, especially as against "mere" government 
functionaries and a manipulable public. 
But I am not entirely sure of that. We do know from reports that she had 
met with Bacanovic a couple of weeks before and that selling ImClone had 
been discussed. (More on this meeting later). Perhaps a figure of $60 was 
mentioned. Would it be possible that she was led to recall that meeting as 
coming to such an understanding, so that the ImClone stock was supposed to 
have been sold when the price dropped to that level? Cognitive research does 
show that motivation can bias recollections even with respect to fairly objective 
factual matters. 
Of course, Stewart allegedly told investigators more than that-she made 
other misstatements about the phone call, and supposedly tried to alter 
documents-and these were the false statements upon which she actually was 
convicted.34 With respect to these, awareness would be harder to deny. At this 
point, the more plausible account would be that if she had convinced herself 
that she was in fact not guilty of insider trading, she felt justified in 
misrepresenting certain facts that otherwise looked bad (for example, the fact 
that there was a phone call from the broker followed quickly by the sale, or that 
there was no good documentation of the instruction to sell). That is an all-too-
32 But see infra note 53, Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The 
Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1319 (1999) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts]. 
33 See Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of 
Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2004). 
34 The jury did not convict based on the $60 "understanding," which was significant 
because of concerns that later surfaced that an expert witness for the prosecution committed 
peIjury in his testimony. See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
aff'd, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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human fonn of moral rationalization,35 but as we saw above, nothing that 
undercuts a finding of scienter. As such, I suspect that her awareness in June 
would satisfy even a psychologically rigorous test for scienter. 
II. MARTHA STEWART'S INSIDER TRADING 
There was no trial with respect to allegations of insider trading by Martha 
Stewart because the prosecution chose not to charge her with such. Many 
observers viewed that as awkward, predicting that the jury would not be 
sympathetic to a claim of lying to investigators about conduct that the 
prosecutors decided wasn't unlawful. In hindsight, we know that the 
prosecution'S strategy worked anyway. 
The implicit message, however, was that there were flaws in the insider 
tradin} case that made it dangerous (or at least complicating) to take to the 
jury.3 What were they? Much of the discussion has been with respect to the 
particular use of the misappropriation theory of liability that would be 
necessary to create liability. Though that may be partially so, I think that we 
also have to return to the scienter requirement. 
TheSEC's civil case against Stewart is fairly clear in its theory ofliability. 
The material non-public infonnation was the fact that the Waksals were selling, 
which allegedly was passed on in the telephone conversation just before 
Stewart unloaded her holdings of ImClone. Infonnation that a controlling 
shareholder was secretly trying to sell off his own and family shares does seem 
to be the sort that a reasonable investor would likely consider important-the 
legal test for materiality. 
This misappropriation theory of liability finds a violation of Rule 10b-5 
when a person who is "entrusted" with confidential infonnation secretly 
breaches his fiduciary duty by tipping or trading.37 The SEC's claim (which 
presumably is the same as what prosecutors would have alleged had they 
brought the case) was that Bacanovic was the misappropriator, under a duty to 
Merrill Lynch and his customer to respect the confidentiality of anyone 
customer's trading. Merrill indeed makes its official policy to that effect clear 
in training and compliance manuals. When he passed the infonnation on to 
Stewart, he violated that expectation. As to Stewart, the misappropriation 
theory makes her liable as a tippee if she knows or recklessly disregards that 
the infonnation has been given to her in violation of the tipper's fiduciary 
duties.38 The SEC emphasized that as a fonner stockbroker, Stewart would 
. 35 Even more so if she thought that the investigation was unfair or politically motivated. 
Cj Dale T. Miller, Psychologically NaiVe Assumptions About the Perils 0/ Conflicts 0/ 
Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, 
MEDICINE AND PUBLIC POLICY 126, 128 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005) ("Much unethical 
behavior is justified by the sense of fairness or entitlement"). 
36 See Michael L.. Siegel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal 
Pro;>ecutorial Power and the Need/or a Law o/Counts, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1107 (2005). 
37 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
38 There are interpretive questions about the precise scope of tipper-tippee liability 
under the misappropriation theory of liability, but they would not likely operate in Stewart's 
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have been aware of the confidentiality rules. 
Here we can see some legal arguments on Stewart's behalf. First, in 
contrast to what misappropriation is normally concerned with (fiduciary 
disloyalty), Bacanovic's action in taking care of a major client like Stewart was 
arguably in Merrill's best interest. As to Merrill, in other words, he was not 
"feigning loyalty" while acting disloyally-the essence of misappropriation. 
Moreover, it would not be surprising to learn that within the brokerage 
community this is an informal norm of "good for business" information sharing 
that departs from the formal confidentiality statement in company policy. As to 
duties Bacanovic owed to Waksal personally, one might wonder whether 
Waksal really had any expectation that his trading would be kept completely 
confidential and not shared with someone like Stewart, who was his close 
friend. After all, he was aggressively getting his father and daughter out of 
ImClone. None of these points is a clear winner for Stewart, but it is easy to see 
how the government's case becomes harder in light of them. 
My sense, however, is that scienter is at least as interesting an issue, and 
raises another potential defense. This brings us back to. Stewart's thought-
process on and around December 27, and here we can draw on some 
background facts provided by behavioral finance scholar Meir Statman in a 
recent paper.39 Stewart was not a very successful investor. She had a portfolio 
loaded with technology stocks (lmClone, in the biotech field, was one), and 
was badly hurt by the technology sector sell-off that occurred in 2000 and 
2001. Her portfolio value (excluding MSLO) declined from $4,530,730 in June 
2000 to $2,510,973 in December 200l. 
What was most notable is how reluctant she was to sell her stocks, which 
may connect to a tendency often noted in the behavioral finance literature.4o 
Stewart was regularly favored with IPO allocations, meaning that she was able 
to buy the stocks at a deep discount to likely near-term market values. Whether 
or not they "flip" immediately, many investors take their profit in the near-
term. Stewart did not, holding the shares through expectedly dramatic price 
increases and then, later on, through the bursting of the tech stock bubble.4 She 
thus managed to lose money even having started in such an extraordinarily 
favorable position. 
Whose fault this was is not clear; Stewart apparently blamed Bacanovic 
and Merrill. In any event, Bacanovic met with Stewart in mid-December to 
urge her sell her "loss" stocks before the end of the year to offset against 
favor. See United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001). 
39 Meir Statman, Martha Stewart's Lessons in Behavioral Finance, 7 1. INY. 
CONSULTING 52 (2005). 
40 See Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The DispOSition to Sell Winners Too Early and 
Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777 (1985). One magazine story 
suggests a different explanation: that Stewart often bought stocks in companies where she 
knew the CEO personally, and felt that selling would be disloyal. See Toobin, supra note 9, 
at 70-7l. Indeed, Stewart had a habit of holding onto winners and losers too long. See 
Statman, supra note 39, at 55. 
41 For example, she bought 350 shares of Palm Inc. at $38 and watched the price go up 
to $95 on the first trading day. When she sold the shares, they were trading at $3.47. 
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taxable income. They discussed each of the holdings, including ImClone, and 
Stewart finally sold off all twenty-two of her loss stocks on December 21 and 
24 for a combined loss of $1,037,874. Because ImClone was one of her few 
profitable stocks (and by far her most profitable), she held onto it.42 Crucially, 
Stewart said that this selling "made her stomach turn,'.43 an interesting 
psychological point. In fact, the tax losses were quite valuable given Stewart's 
other income. However, having to finally admit defeat and take the losses-
notwithstanding such potential for gain a year or two earlier-was devastating 
to Stewart's ego, and generated a good deal of anger and regret. So far as her 
investments were concerned, Stewart was in late December in an emotionally 
depressed state. 
Then, on December 27, just three days after the stomach-turning sales 
were done, she got the phone call from Bacanovic' s assistant indicating that her 
only remaining winner, ImClone, was also about to implode. One can at least 
appreciate what was no doubt a very emotional response-not this one, too! If 
she had a chance to avoid this loss by selling before the market adjusted, such 
risky behavior can at least be placed in context,44 though it certainly wouldn't 
be a defense to insider trading. 
What is legally a defense is the absence of scienter. Defining scienter with 
respect to insider trading has been controversial, with courts and the SEC 
disagreeing about whether it must be shown that the defendant "used" the 
inside information to profit (i.e., that he traded because of the information) or 
whether mere possession of the information is enough, without regard to 
motivation.45 In 2000, the SEC sought to resolve the controversy via Rule 
lOb5-1, establishing an "awareness" standard that conforms closely to the 
prevailing standard in non-insider trading IOb-5 cases, as we have seen. 
This controversy largely assumed that the information was material and 
nonpublic, however, and focused solely on whether a causal link between that 
information and the trading is necessary. A more subtle scienter issue is what 
awareness the defendant must have as to either the materiality or the non-public 
nature of the information when there is some ambiguity. In particular, would a 
defendant lack scienter if he or she thought that the information was public, 
even though it wasn't? Although the case law on this is sparse, it would seem 
42 She had bought ImClone at $16, and as of mid-December had a gain of some 
$186,000. 
43 See Statman, supra note 39, at 55. 
44 See Jessica S. Lerner & David Keltner, Fear, Anger and Risk, 81 J. PERS. & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 146 (2001) (anger leads to riskier behavior). For a good review of the research on 
the role of emotions in securities trading-which generally suggests that more emotional 
traders perform more poorly than less emotional ones-see Andrew W. Lo et aI., Fear and 
Greed in Financial Markets: A Clinical Study of Day-Traders (March 22, 2005) (working 
paper, Mass. Inst. Tech.), available at http://web.mit.eduJalo/www/Papers/lorepsteen4.pdf; 
see also Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in the Securities 
Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501 (Francesco Paresi & 
Vernon L. Smith, eds., 2005). 
45 See Donna M. Nagy, The "Possession v. Use" Debate in the Context of Securities 
Trading By Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 
1129 (1999). 
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Now consider what Stewart learned from Bacanovic's assistant. Initially, 
there were two bits of information in the phone message-that the Waksals 
were selling and that Bacanovic expected the price to decline. She called the 
broker's assistant and learned one more fact-that the price had already fallen a 
good bit. My suspicion is that (especially in an'angry and emotional state) she 
could easily construe this to mean that adverse information had already reached 
the market, and the big institutions were starting to bailout. She did not want to 
be left behind, again. 
As to the Waksals' selling, I suspect that she construed this as the Waksals 
and much of Wall Street. In fact, it is hard to imagine (especially to a former 
stockbroker) that she would assume that she was being told that the Waksals 
were selling illegally-which would be the case if the information had not yet 
made it to the market. Illegal sales by senior executives do not usually occur in 
an unconcealed fashion through, a reputable broker. Again, the more likely 
inference is that word about Erbitux had become public and that the Waksals 
were joining the crowd. 
Whether this is a successful defense as a matter of law is a bit murky. As 
Rule 10b5-1 shows, the SEC prefers a simplified state of mind inquiry, and 
could claim that even if the foregoing were true (1) Stewart still had one piece 
of information that the rest of the world did not, received from a private source 
in arguable breach of fiduciary duty;47 (2) under these circumstances, she 
recklessly failed to ascertain the state of public knowledge before selling; and 
(3) that information does not become public until it isfully internalized by the 
market (i.e., trading by the smart money is not enough if the price is still 
d· . ) 48 a Justmg . ' . 
My point is not to argue the law on these questions,49 but rather to point 
out that Stewart's actions may have fallen short of at least the spirit of the 
scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5, which requires conscious awareness. 
And even if she did act with scienter because the law (i.e., Rule I Ob5-1) is 
construed to make scienter easier for the SEC or prosecutors to prove in the 
insider trading context, we see a consequence that might be somewhat 
troubling: people can be guilty of insider trading even under circumstances that 
46 For a discussion, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, 
ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 5.5 (2004 ed.); see also Alan Horwich, The Neglected 
Relationship Between Materiality and Recklessness Under Rule JOb-5, 55 Bus. LAW. 1023 
(2000). 
47 See United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996). 
48 The SEC has fairly consistently held to the view that information is not public until it 
is generally available to the investing public. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 46, at § 5.4. 
49 The case would have been more complicated as a criminal action because courts 
sometimes insist on a higher level of scienter in criminal insider trading cases as compared 
to civil. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, ISS F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998) (use rather than 
possession); United States v. Cassese, 290 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (knowledge of 
tender offer in case brought under 14e-3), ajJ'd on other grounds, 428 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
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evidence a very low level of moral culpability.5o Perhaps that is a fair trade-off 
with respect to civil enforcement,51 but the threat of criminal prosecution raises 
the stakes considerably. My impression that Stewart may have lacked a 
contemporaneous appreciation that this was illegal insider trading is supported 
by her own lack of any effort whatsoever to conceal the trading. Like the 
Waksals, she left the trading wide open for Merrill's internal compliance 
personnel and federal investigators to see. Either she made an emotional, angry 
decision without regard for the legal risks to avoid a tiny loss or she believed 
that what she did was justifiable. Probably it was a combination of the twO.52 In 
any event, it was very different from the kinds of behavior we generally think 
of as core insider trading abuses.53 
III. SELF-SERVING BIASES 
Some perceptual biases (such as the gorilla example) are purely cognitive, 
reflecting heuristics associated with bounded rationality. Others are 
motivated-reality is distorted in order to maintain a preferred impression, 
which may be important for the preservation of self-esteem, confidence, etc. 
Because motivated biases are functional, they may thrive even in competitive 
market situations. 54 
Self-serving biases are likely to be especially important with respect to 
scienter. A great deal of research has been done on auditor perceptions and 
judgments with respect to client adherence to accounting standards and fair 
value presentation, which are often very subjective. The standard post-Enron 
claim is that auditors were biased because of conflicts of interest based on the 
provision of non-audit services; if so, the regulatory steps to eliminate non-
audit services should be a useful intervention. But a number. of researchers are 
doubtful: they believe that auditor bias is self-serving, a way of comin¥ to agree 
with the client in order to maintain and foster the audit relationship.5 If this is 
right, then only a more radical intervention (e.g., making the auditor see some 
group other than management as its "principal") will cause the realignment. 
And that might simply shift the direction of the bias rather than eliminate it. In 
any event, absent effective intervention many forms of biased auditing will be 
unconscious rather than intentional, raising similar scienter issues to those 
50 See Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule lOb5-1 and the Death of 
Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 147 (2003). 
51 The core remedy in a civil insider trading case is disgorgement; other remedies (e.g., 
an injunction or a civil penalty) are discretionary and vary with the perceived culpability of 
the conduct. 
52 This issue was raised by Stewart's lawyers at her criminal trial, The prosecution 
responded by saying that white collar criminals often do stupid things. See Toobin, supra 
note 9, at 71. 
53 To be sure, the SEC treats all insider trading enforcement actions as morality plays. 
See Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts, supra note 32, at 1329-30. 
54 See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 7, at 158. 
55 See. e.g., Max Bazerman et aI., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. Bus. 
REv., Nov. 2002, at 97. 
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discussed above. 
Recent research on conflicts of interest-which are of course a central 
concern of securities regulation56-is particularly intriguing. A series of studies 
demonstrates that the disclosure of conflicts of interest is not always 
productive, for two reasons. 57 One is that the recipient of the disclosure is 
insufficiently self-protective. The more interesting is that the disclosure gives 
the person with the conflict a self-serving excuse to be opportunistic. If the 
discloser's perception is that the recipient has been given fair warning, it 
becomes easier to perceive opportunism as fair play rather than a violation of 
trust. As such, scienter may be diminished or lacking, because the person 
making the disclosure will not necessarily be aware that the opportunism is 
misleading. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our clinical inquiry into the securities fraud cases against Martha Stewart 
that never happened considered only one dimension to an interesting event. 
Others have looked at the case with a view toward other dimensions: 
ambiguities in the law of insider trading, for example, which permit factors 
such as envy, gender bias, or political bias to have an undue influence on 
prosecutorial decisions or trial outcomes,58 or how celebrities are treated in the 
judicial system. I do not mean in this brief paper to have looked at the case 
from all angles. 
Rather, my aim has been to stay close to the behavioral law and economics 
project. Legal standards that require some element of subjective intent, 
willfulness or bad faith are usually imposed to describe highly culpable forms 
of behavior, thereby justifying harsh liability consequences. Securities fraud is 
certainly such, and recently the view has grown that those who commit 
securities fraud are bad actors deserving punishments that substantially exceed 
even those attaching to most violent crimes. 
My sense is that culpability with respect to securities fraud is in fact very 
hard to parse out, running a broad range from the truly sociopathic (scams that 
prey on and devastate the finances of the unsuspecting elderly) to conduct that 
should have been better but reflected a good bit more myopia, rationalization, 
and self-deception than any deliberate deceit. Used carefully, the tools of 
cognitive and social psychology under the rubric of behavioral law and 
56 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking 
the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003). 
57 See Daylian M. Cain et aI., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2005). 
58 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 
26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2023 (2005); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, AI Capone's 
Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pre textual Prosecution, IDS COLUM. L. REV. 
583 (2005); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal 
Justice in u.s. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (2003). On the 
aspects of the case that emerged after the trial and conviction, see Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Mostly Martha, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 517 (2005). 
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economics can be of substantial help in parsing out how people (including, and 
perhaps especially, those who thrive in corporations or financial markets) 
perceive information and make judgments, which in turn will get us much 
closer to what those suspected of fraud were thinking, how much blame and 
punishment is deserved, and how the law might be reframed to encourage more 
thoughtful assessments of culpability. 
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